Torts by King, George Savage
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 13 Issue 3 Article 13 
Spring 1961 
Torts 
George Savage King 
University of South Carolina School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
King, George Savage (1961) "Torts," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 13 : Iss. 3 , Article 13. 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol13/iss3/13 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
TORTS
GEORGE SAVAGE KING*
I. CHARITABLE AND MUNICIPAL TORT ImmUNITY
Perhaps the most significant of the torts cases decided dur-
ing the period of this review is that of Eiserhardt v. State
A. & M. Soc'y of South Carolina,' in which the Supreme Court
recognized that a charitable corporation's immunity from tort
liability does not extend to non-charitable activities "primarily
commercial in character and unconnected with" its charitable
purposes. In this case plaintiff was injured as a result of
stepping into a hole in a parking lot operated by the defend-
ant on its State Fair grounds on the night of a football game
at Carolina Stadium. The appeal was from a refusal of the
trial judge to grant defendant's motion for judgment on the
pleadings because defendant was chartered as an eleemosy-
nary corporation. The Supreme Court held that the chari-
table character of a corporation is dependent upon the facts
and that its charter as an eleemosynary corporation is not
conclusive, therefore, the motion was properly refused. The
Court expressly reserved its opinion as to the relation of the
operation of a parking lot to the charitable purposes of de-
fendant.
The significance of this case lies in the willingness of the
Court to recognize the distinction between those activities
which have a direct relation to the charitable purposes and
those which do not. For the purposes of further clarification
of the law in this area, it is unfortunate that the case was
subsequently settled without litigation on the merits. It would
be very useful to know whether the operation of a parking
lot for a football game which the defendant was not spon-
soring was directly related to its charitable purposes. The
key language in the case is the Court's statement:
And we do not think immunity should be extended to
a situation where the activity out of which the alleged
liability arose is primarily commercial in character and
wholly unconnected with the charitable purpose for
which the corporation was organized.
2
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 235 S. C. 305, 111 S. E. 2d 568 (1959).
2. Id. at 312, 111 S. E. 2d at 572.
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If the emphasis is placed on "primarily commercial in char-
acter" in classifying the activities of defendant which axe
in issue, it will be difficult enough for a plaintiff to bring
himself within the rule, but if there is added to it the re-
quirement "and wholly unconnected with the charitable pur-
pose", then the plaintiff's chances of having his day in court
will be slight indeed. It should be borne in mind that the
mere absence of immunity does not spell liability. It only
opens the door of the courts to the plaintiff so that he can
have his claim adjudged under the existing law which per-
mits the defendant to assert every defense any other defend-
ant would have under the same circumstances.
Since the almost universal condemnation of the charitable
immunity doctrine in recent years, its complete abandonment
has been accelerated by the eroding effect of exceptions and
modifications even in those jurisdictions where the courts
have accepted the argument that its abolition can come only
through legislation.3 In 1953 the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton rejected the argument that it should await legislative
change in the following language, "We closed our courtroom
doors without legislative help and we can likewise open
them".4
In the light of the modern demands on the legislature which
expose the individual legislators to such pressures that no
legislation unsupported by some organized effort has much
chance of passage, it remains for the courts to keep the com-
mon law abreast of the needs of society and particularly of
the needs of the individuals who make up that society. No
individual expects to be an injured plaintiff seeking a remedy
against a charitable institution, therefore, he has little interest
in proposing or supporting legislation to change the rule until
he is a victim. The courts are the guardians of the rights
of individuals, and are best equipped to weigh dispassionately
the competing interests to be served unaffected by the clamor
of interested pressure groups.
An ancient principle of law sometimes expressed in
Latin, "Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex", is: The
reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases. Apply-
ing this principle to the charitable immunity doctrine there
is little support for its continuation. The originally declared
3. See Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N. E. 2d 81 (1950).
4. Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n., 43 Wash. 2d 162,
260 P. 2d 765, 774 (1953).
2
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need to protect the charitable funds is no longer realistic
with the availability of liability insurance. It's hardly char-
itable to take from a family the breadwinner of that family
by reason of wrongful conduct and then deny to it what might
be the sole means to prevent it from becoming literally the
object of charity. To add the family of the injured plaintiff
to the public charity rolls would in itself not necessarily con-
serve charitable funds, although it may conserve those of the
defendant.
Much of what is said above could apply equally to the rule
of municipal immunity from tort liability which was reiterat-
ed by the South Carolina Supreme Court in the case of
McKenzie v. City of Florence.5 The plaintiff sought to recover
damages for personal injuries allegedly suffered at the hands
of the defendant's police when wrongfully arrested. The city
had paid premiums on a "bond" to indemnify it for any loss
arising out of the misconduct or failure of the police to per-
form their duties properly. The Court held that in the absence
of statutory permission plaintiff could not maintain a suit
against defendant for tort liability and that defendant's pur-
chase of the bond was not a waiver of immunity up to the
amount of the bond because no statute empowers a municipal-
ity to waive such immunity.
Plaintiff had sought to have the court overrule the line of
cases in which the tort immunity of municipalities had been
established. In declaring that it would not overrule the earlier
cases the court said, "This Court is not invested with the
power to make laws."8 [Emphasis added]
It would seem to be answer enough to this remark to quote
this very Court in a subsequent decision in which it was held
that a child born alive may maintain an action for pre-
natal injuries inflicted by a negligent defendant:
We think the reasons assigned by the courts for holding
that a child after birth may not maintain an action for
prenatal injuries are unsound, illogical and unjust. We
need not be concerned about lack of precedent. There
is now plenty.7 [In other jurisdictions]
5. 234 S. C. 428, 108 S. E. 2d 825 (1959). For a more thorough dis-
cussion of this case and the law involved see casenote, 12 S. C. L. Q. 478
(1960).
6. Id. at 435, 108 S. E. 2d at 828.
7. Hall v. Murphy, 236 S. C. 257, 262, 113 S. E. 2d 790, 793 (1960).
Cf. West v. McCoy, 233 S. C. 369, 105 S. E. 2d 88 (1958).
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Few lawyers in South Carolina or elsewhere would have been
willing to predict as recent as fifteen years ago that such
an action would ever be permitted. There was ample and
long-standing precedent (in other jurisdictions) to the con-
trary and no legislation was enacted, but the Court "made
law". This is as it should be if the Court is to perform its
proper function. The needs for certainty and predictability
required for justice in the fields of property law do not carry
over into all fields of law. Professor Warren Seavey of Har-
vard, who recently retired after fifty years of teaching torts,
said:
S.. [I]n the law of Torts predictability is chiefly im-
portant to prevent unnecessary litigation. Assuming that
one has been at fault and has caused harm to another,
he comes within the general tort principle which would
impose liability upon him, and he is in no position to
complain that he should not pay for the harm he caused
merely because of a prior decision on similar facts that
no cause of action existed.
... In other words, I am suggesting that the doctrine
of stare decisis is relative to the subject matter with
which the cases deal.
In fact, the growth of the law, particularly that of the
law of Torts, proves that the judges, and particularly the
great judges, have felt bound to sacrifice the rule to
preserve the principle. Every interest protected for the
first time represented a breaking away from prior prec-
edents.9
The late Chief Justice Stone of the United States Supreme
Court is quoted as saying:
If, with discerning eye, we see differences as well as
resemblances in the facts and experiences of the present
when compared with those recorded in the precedents,
we take the decisive step toward the achievement of a
progressive science of law. If our appraisals are me-
chanical and superficial, the law which they generate
will likewise be mechanical and superficial, to become
at last but dry and sterile formalism.
It is just here, within the limited area where the judge
has freedom of choice of the rule which he is to adopt,
8. SEAvEY, COGITATIONS ON TORTS at 67 (1954).
9. Id. at 69.
1961]
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and in his comparison of the experiences of the past
with those of the present, that occurs the most critical
and delicate operation in the process of judicial law-
tnaking.'0
In denying the plaintiff's plea for overruling of the exist-
ing tort immunity of municipalities the South Carolina Su-
.preme Court did not examine the arguments on their merits,
-satisfying itself principally with reliance on the fact that
the rule was of long standing and that any change should
,come through legislation. This again raises the question of
what group has a sufficient interest to press for the neces-
sary remedial legislation?
II. TRESPASS TO PROPERTY
In Hinson v. Sistare Const. Co.," the plaintiff landowner's
verdict for $200 "nominal" compensatory damages was re-
versed but his verdict for $2,000 punitive damages was af-
firmed. The Court held that it was not necessary for the
plaintiff to suffer actual damages in order to sustain a
verdict for punitive damages where the defendant's trespass
had been willful. Defendant was a road contractor who had
been the successful bidder on a contract to construct a portion
of a state highway. The State Highway Department had con-
demned a portion of the plaintiff's land for the purposes of
the highway. The condemnation award which was made by
the Condemnation Board was appealed by the plaintiff prop-
erty owner to the Court of Common Pleas, thus staying the
right of the defendant to go on the property of the plaintiff
until such time as the highway department made a tender of
the amount of the Condemnation Board's award to the plain-
tiff. In this case the contractor defendant proceeded to send
his bulldozers onto plaintiff's land before the highway de-
partment had made a tender of the amount of the award.
Even though the defendant had no actual knowledge of the
necessity that a tender be made before he would have a
right to go on the premises of the plaintiff, he was charged
-%vith knowledge of the law. The reason for the court's re-
versal of the finding of the jury of $200 compensatory
damages was that the plaintiff had received a condemnation
award for the full value of his land; therefore, any damage
10. In Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D. D. C. 1946).
11. 236 S. C. 125, 113 S. E. 2d 341 (1960).
[Vol. is
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done to the land by the defendant was not an injury to the
plaintiff. Holding that the verdict was not responsive to
the judge's instruction on nominal damages, the court said,
"The verdict for $200 is a verdict for a substantial, not
nominal, damages.'
12
III. FALSE IMPRISONMENT
Two cases'3 involving actions for false imprisonment came
before the court during the period under review, but both
were on the pleadings. Neither makes a contribution to
the substantive law and therefore are not deserving of any
discussion.
IV. FRAUD
In Jackson v. Hobbs,14 the plaintiff alleged fraud on the
part of the defendant insurance company and its agent in
that she was induced to reduce the amount of insurance that
she carried on her store building from $1,000 to $500 ap-
proximately thirty days before the store building was burned
and lost by fire. The plaintiff had previously had a policy
with another company for $1,000 but had received notice
from the agent of that company that, upon the expiration
of the policy, the amount of the insurance would be reduced
to $500. Through a friend, she was referred to the defend-
ant Hobbs, who was agent for the defendant insurance com-
pany, who in turn did write a policy for her for $1,000. A
little more than two months after the issuance of the policy,
the agent, Hobbs, came to plaintiff and told her that she
would have to accept a reduction in the amount of the policy
to $500 or the company would have to cancel it. As a result
she signed an endorsement which indicated her acceptance of
the reduction of the amount of the insurance to $500. As
the court emphasizes, there was no allegation that the plain-
tiff was illiterate or unable to understand the endorsement
which she signed agreeing to the reduction in the amount of
the insurance. The representation made by the defendant
agent to the plaintiff that she could obtain an original amount
of $1,000 insurance was accurate and the policy was issued
in that amount. The fact that it was subsequently reduced
to $500 was in no sense a misrepresentation to the insured
12. Id. at 134, 113 S. E. 2d at 345.
13. Thomas v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 113 S. E. 2d 337 (1960); Hopkins
v. Shuman, 235 S. C. 191, 110 S. E. 2d 713 (1959).
14. 234 S. C. 497, 109 S. E. 2d 161 (1959).
1961]
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plaintiff. She was told that if she did not accept the reduc-
tion, the company would have to cancel the policy and there
is no allegation to show that this was not the fact. The Su-
preme Court affirmed, adopting the trial court's order sus-
taining the demurrer of the defendant as its opinion.
Another deceit action involving an insurance company de-
fendant is Reid v. George Washington Life Ins. Co.15 In this
case, an 80 year old lady brought suit against the defendant
alleging that the terms of her hospital insurance policy issued
by the defendant had been misrepresented to her by the de-
fendant's agent at the time she purchased the policy some
seven and a half years prior to the time of her illness. The
plaintiff contends that the agent represented that the policy
included medical payments for doctor's calls and ambulance
service although the policy excluded such items. The Court
held that where one has possession of an instrument that
sets forth clearly the terms of the agreement and has had
it for so ample a time as seven years and there is no allega-
tion that the plaintiff is unable to ascertain the contents there-
of by reading it, then there can be no complaint as to the
terms of the agreement. Plaintiff was put on notice by the
terms of the insurance policy as to what the coverage was
and if she had any question about it she should have com-
municated with the defendant company at an earlier time
following the sale to her.
In the case of Gary v. Jordan,0 the defendant sold cattle
to the plaintiff after having represented that they were
"clean" when in fact they had been exposed to Bang's dis-
ease and some of the cattle were suspects. When subsequent
test results necessitated slaughter of a number of the cattle,
the plaintiff sued to recover from the defendant for misrep-
resentation and obtained a verdict. The Court would not
agree with the defendant that actual knowledge of his mis-
representation was necessary in order to make out a cause
of action for fraud. The Court said, ". . . to make a false
representation recklessly, without knowledge as to its truth,
is tantamount, in contemplation of law, to making it with
knowledge of its falsity. '17 It concluded by finding that there
was ample evidence to support the finding of the jury that
the defendant was aware of his lack of knowledge of the
15. 234 S. C. 599, 109 S. E. 2d 577 (1959).
16. 236 S. C. 144, 113 S. E. 2d 730 (1960).
17. Id. at 154, 113 S. E. 2d 735.
400 [Vol. 13
7
King: Torts
Published by Scholar Commons, 1961
SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
truth of the fact that he represented, if not of the falsity
of that fact. The plaintiff's not separating certain of the
cattle from the remainder of his herd upon his learning of
the fact that the cattle had been exposed to Bang's disease,
even if considered negligent, was after the fact of the fraud
perpetrated by the defendant upon the plaintiff and would
therefore have no effect on the cause of action.
In Jones v. Cooper s the plaintiff sued the defendant for
fraud in defendant's sale of some hot dog cooking machines.
Under the terms of an agreement between the parties the
defendant had agreed to obtain locations about the city of
High Point, N. C., in which the plaintiff lived, where the
machines would be placed for the purpose of selling hot dogs.
The defendant's agent had placed the machines in locations
which were, according to the testimony of the plaintiff, chief-
ly Negro business establishments of such low standing that
he was reluctant to go into them to service the machines as
would be required. Plaintiff was so dissatisfied with the
locations and the amount of time which he found would be
consumed in servicing the machines that he withdrew them
all from the locations in which the defendant's agent had
placed them. He then undertook to return them to the de-
fendant and the defendant refused to accept them on the
ground that the plaintiff had made an outright purchase of
the machines and they were his property. The plaintiff con-
tended that the defendant misrepresented to him the amount
of time which would be necessary to service the machines
and the money which he could earn by the operation of the
machines in various business establishments as well as the
types of locations in which the machines were placed. The
Court pointed to the fact that the defendant fulfilled every
term of the agreement just as he had made it. That the
plaintiff himself signed a list approving the locations of the
machines, and that the plaintiff had never given the machines
an opportunity to operate in order to prove whether they
could earn $100 a week as the defendant had contended. The
Court emphasized the fact that the plaintiff himself was a
salesman; that he knew what he was signing when he signed
the contract with the defendant; that there was no conten-
tion that he could not read; that he was responsible for
knowing the terms of the contract. The mere fact that the
18. 234 S. C. 477, 109 S. E. 2d 5 (1959).
19611 401
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defendant represented that the plaintiff might earn as much
as $100 per week out of the business was not a representation
of an existing fact but a promise as to the future which is
not a sufficient representation for a cause of action for fraud.
This type of representation, called "puffing" in the law, was
referred to by plaintiff himself as "sales talk." Finding no
ground on which an action for fraud could be supported, a
yerdict and judgment for the plaintiff was reversed and
judgment entered for the defendant.
V. NUISANCE
The fact that plaintiffs alleged that the quiet enjoyment of
their homes and the health of the members of the plaintiffs'
families would be disturbed by the operation of a super-
market in the neighborhood, particularly where it was alleged
that large motor trucks would be unloading from time to
time "during and after regular business hours" and that
certain of the members of the plaintiff's household were sub-
ject to various ailments caused by allergies traceable mainly
to dust, was sufficient to overrule the defendant's demurrer
to the complaint seeking to enjoin the construction of the
supermarket on the location adjoining plaintiff's property.
The Court concluded in Strong v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.,1 9
that these allegations were sufficient to take the case to the
jury if proof could be offered to sustain the allegation. It
therefore reversed the sustaining of the demurrer.
VI. NEGLIGENCE
(a) Traffic Accidents
(1) Railroad Crossings
Where the decedent drove onto the railroad track in front
of an oncoming train, which could be seen for approximately
a mile, and his car stalled resulting in its being struck by the
defendant's train, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff
was guilty of gross contributory negligence as a matter of
law. Plaintiff's effort to have the doctrine of last clear
chance applied in this situation was held to be inappropriate.
The Court pointed to the fact that the train was only some
120 or 180 feet away from the crossing at the time the car
approached the crossing, so that by the time it was up on
19. 235 S. C. 646, 112 S. E. 2d 646 (1960).
[Vol. 13
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the tracks, the train was somewhat less than that away from
the vehicle. The trial judge's judgment n.o.v. was affirmed
on appeal in Bramlett v. Southern Ry. Co.
20
A verdict for $67,618 actual damages was affirmed on
appeal in Johnson v. Charleston & W. C. Ry. 21 Plaintiff's
decedent was killed in a collision with defendant's train at
a highway crossing when he ran into an unlighted freight
car which was slowly moving across the intersection. The
night was foggy and misty and there was no evidence that
that railroad had placed any particular warnings in front
of the train such as flares, or a watchman with a flag or
with a lantern. There were conflicts in the testimony which
the court felt were sufficient to justify submission of the
case to the jury. It held that the alleged contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff was not sufficient to overcome the fail-
ure on the part of the defendant to ring the bell and blow
the whistle on the train in accord with the requirements of
the crossing statute.22 In discussing the size of the verdict,
the Court said, ". . . we cannot say from the record here
that it was so shockingly excessive as to require the conclusion
for which appellant contends. ' 23
(2) Truck-pedestrian
In Thompson v. Washington,2 4 decided by the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, judgment for the plaintiff
was reversed on the grounds that there was no evidence to
support the finding of the trial judge. The decedent, a three
year old boy, was crossing the highway when struck by the
defendant's truck, whose driver was accompanied by another
driver, while the truck was on its proper side of the high-
way. The decedent had been in a cotton field where his
mother was working and came through some underbrush,
bordering a ditch paralleling the highway, and out onto the
highway. A path paralleled the highway for at least thirteen
feet from the point decedent crossed the highway . The Court
of Appeals found that there was no testimony of any witness
that the child had actually come along the pathway parallel
to the road where he could have been seen by approaching
motorists before he attempted to cross the highway. But,
20. 234 S. C. 283, 108 S. E. 2d 91 (1959).
21. 234 S. C. 448, 108 S. E. 2d 777 (1959).
22. CODE OF LAWS OF SoUTH CARoLInA § 58-743 (1952).
23. 234 S. C. at 469, 108 S. E. 2d at 787.
24. 266 F. 2d 147 (4th Cir. 1959).
1961]
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by contrast, there was the testimony of both truck drivers
that the child had come directly across the highway from the
adjoining field and had run through the bushes and tall
weeds which were along the edge of the field and the side
of the road so that they did not see him more than some
thirty-five feet before striking him. Concluding that the
judge's finding that the child first walked along the roadside
could only be based on conjecture or surmise, the court found
no negligence by defendant.
(3) Truok-truck
In the case of Collins v. Risner'2 5 the plaintiff was driving
a bakery truck on the highway before daylight, following
another truck of the same company. The truck ahead of
him stopped for reasons that he didn't know. The plaintiff
stopped along side of the first truck, leaving his truck par-
tially on the highway, and opened his right hand door to ask
of the first driver, "What's the matter?" Before the first
driver could answer, the defendant's truck, which had been
following the plaintiff, crashed into the back of the plain-
tiff's truck and did serious harm to him. The truck in which
the plaintiff was riding weighed some six tons; the defend-
ant's truck, 25 tons; and it was a tractor-trailer which de-
fendant had been driving for more than seven hours before
having the collision at about six o'clock in the morning. At
the trial the court removed all consideration of any gross
negligence and the plaintiff's case was submitted to the jury
on the basis of negligence alone. The jury found for the
plaintiff in the sum of $15,000; nevertheless, the court set
the verdict aside and gave a judgment n.o.v. for the defend-
ant. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
The court found no error in the conclusion of the district
judge that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law in that he violated a statute which re-
quires that one pull off the highway altogether insofar as
it is practical to do so when he stops his vehicle. The evidence
showed that plaintiff clearly could have done so. There was
some evidence in the case to which the court did not attach
much weight that the defendant had said right after the ac-
cident that he must have fallen asleep. This evidence, never-
theless, precipitated a discussion by the court of the legal
25. 269 F. 2d 654 (4th Cir. 1959).
Vol. 13
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effect of one's falling asleep while driving on the highway.
The court pointed to the general rule that the mere fact that
one drops to sleep while driving a vehicle does not establish
gross negligence, though it is sufficient for negligence. The
rule requires that there be a showing of some symptoms
which put the defendant on notice that he is likely to drop
to sleep; such symptoms as drowsiness,-or such a previous
lack of sleep that it would reasonably indicate that he might
fall asleep because of the lack of it. There is no governing
South Carolina case on this point and so the court concluded
that it would follow the general rule.
Judging by other traffic cases in which the South Carolina
Supreme Court has found gross negligence, it would seem that
dropping asleep when driving a truck of more than 25 tons
while following behind two other trucks on the highway
would certainly be evidence of at least gross negligence, if
not recklessness. Even dropping asleep while driving a much
lighter vehicle on an open highway with no traffic in sight
would seem to create a sure risk of very serious harm. The
question might also be raised as to whether one could ever
go to sleep without having some prior warnings of the fact
that he is likely to fall asleep. Whenever the South Carolina
Supreme Court does have the question presented, it is hoped
that it will not be satisfied with a rule which finds no room
for gross negligence in dropping asleep while driving a 25
ton truck on the highway. This comment does not reflect
disagreement with the result in this case, but it would be
regrettable to allow the doubtfulness of the proof of a fact
in a given case to determine the limits of a rule to be adopted,
and which may have future application.
(4) Tiuck-auto
Of the four cases under this heading, three were decided
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
In the first of these, Kosa v. Hicks, 26 the plaintiff's judg-
ment was affirmed. He had suffered injuries while making
a left turn in his truck from the highway into a side road.
Defendant's auto struck plaintiff's truck after the defendant
had pulled out into the left lane to pass another automobile
immediately in front of the defendant, and which had ob-
structed defendant's view of the plaintiff's truck just ahead
26. 266 F. 2d 74 (4th Cir. 1959).
19611
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of the automobile. Plaintiff had given a left turn signal
which had been seen by the automobile immediately following
him but which had not been seen by the defendant. By the
time the defendant was able to see plaintiff's truck making
the left turn, it was too late for him to slow down enough
to avoid the collision because he was travelling at such a
rapid rate relative to the speed of the other two vehicles. The
court was not impressed with defendant's argument that the
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, as a matter
of law, because he made the left turn without observing the
defendant behind him. The court pointed to the fact that
the plaintiff had no duty to observe what could not be ob-
served. The location of defendant's vehicle behind the auto-
mobile between plaintiff and defendant prevented his being
seen.
Defendant's directed verdict was set aside on appeal in
Grooms v. Minute Maid.27 Plaintiff was injured when his
automobile was involved in a head-on collision with defend-
ant's truck. A second truck, which had been following plain-
tiff pulled out to pass plaintiff when defendant's truck sud-
denly appeared at the crest of a hill coming at a very high
rate of speed. While trying to pull back into his original
lane behind plaintiff's car, he struck the rear of plaintif's
automobile, knocking it into the path of the defendant's
oncoming vehicle.
The district judge directed a verdict for the defendant,
declaring that he was bound by a South Carolina case which
had held that a defendant's excessive rate of speed was not
the proximate cause of the injury to another who unexpect-
edly and suddenly was knocked into his path when the de-
fendant was on his proper side of the road. The Court of
Appeals pointed to the fact that the case to which the district
judge referred had a proviso attached to this statement of
the rule reading, "provided the driver who is on his proper
side f the road does all that is reasonably possible to avoid
the collision after he discovers the peril."28 Since there was
testimony that the defendant's truck was approaching at
a speed of at least 70 miles per hour, and that it was at least
1,100 feet away from the point of collision when it came
into view, the Court of Appeals felt that there was sufficient
27. 267 F. 2d 541 (4th Cir. 1959).
28. Id. at 545.
[Vol. 13
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evidence to go to the jury on the question of the reasonable-
ness of the defendant driver's conduct under these circum-
stances. The second truck, which had undertaken to pass
plaintiff's automobile, was required to pull back in line be-
cause of the rapid speed at which the defendant's truck was
approaching, and the Court of Appeals found that, therefore,
defendant's speed could have been a factor in the plaintiff's
injury.
In Pepsi-Cola Distribs. v. Barker29 the Court of Appeals
affirmed a jury's verdict for the plaintiff. Both the defend-
ant and the plaintiff contended that they had the right of
way at the street intersection at which they collided. There
were traffic signal lights but the evidence was in conflict as
to which one had the green light. The court held that such
a conflict of testimony was clearly a question for the jury
and that the trial court properly overruled the motions for
a directed verdict.
In the case of Wineglass v. McMinn,30 the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that the defendant, who was doing
business as the Dr. Pepper Bottling Co., was liable to the
plaintiff for injuries inflicted on him by the defendant's
truck when it suddenly lurched forward from its parked po-
sition hitting plaintiff, who was between his parked station
wagon and the front of the truck. Plaintiff's injury was
caused by the attempt of the fourteen year old boy, who
helped on the truck but knew nothing about driving one,
to move the truck. The regular driver of defendant's truck
had gone "down the street" for a few minutes leaving the
boy with the truck. The ignition key was in the truck, though
the motor was not running. When a third party insisted
that the boy move the truck so he could move his car which
was behind the truck, the boy attempted to do so and caused
the accident. The court found the necessary negligence on
the part of the defendant in its truck driver's failure to
maintain proper custody of the vehicle, although the boy
made an attempt to locate the driver before submitting to
the demand that he move the truck. Thus the question of
the boy's relation to the defendant company did not have
to be answered in order to determine the company's liability.
29. 274 F. 2d 372 (4th Cir. 1960).
30. 235 S. C. 537, 112 S. E. 2d 652 (1960).
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(5) Auto-auto
In Dean v. Temptron3' the court found that the question
of the negligence and contributory negligence of the respect-
ive drivers of two automobiles which collided at an intersec-
tion of the highway was a question for the jury and affirmed
plaintiff's judgment. The driver of the defendant's vehicle
stopped very suddenly without just cause as he approached
an intersection at which he had the right of way and the
plaintiff's car piled into the back end of the defendant's
car doing extensive damage.
(6) Guest statute
Jackson v. Jackson32 is a case in which plaintiff, the wife,
was injured in an automobile accident when riding with her
husband, the defendant. Defendant, after driving recklessly
through the streets of the city, collided with a parked vehicle.
The plaintiff's testimony was that she knew that her hus-
band had had a drink but that she did not know that he was
intoxicated; that he drove in this reckless manner over her
protests just before the collision occurred. The testimony of
the police officers who investigated the accident conflicted
with that of the plaintiff in certain particulars about the
condition of the vehicle prior to the accident. The defendant
did not put up any witnesses in his behalf and the trial judge
directed a verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, the Supreme
Court decided that the evidence was susceptible of more than
one inference in that the credibility of the plaintiff as a
witness was a question for the trier of the fact. The mere
fact that the plaintiff had testified as she did as to certain
facts did not mean that the jury would have to accept these
statements as true. The case was reversed for a trial by
jury.
(b) Duty Owed to Persons on Defendant's Premises
The Court of Appeals in a per curiam opinion sustained the
direction of a verdict for the defendant in the case of Burkley
v. The A & P Tea Co.33 As the plaintiff was leaving the de-
fendant's supermarket, she was injured by a young boy who
rushed through the entrance door and collided with her. The
plaintiff contended that the defendant was negligent in that
31. 234 S. C. 532, 109 S. E. 2d 167 (1959).
32. 234 S. C. 291, 108 S. E. 2d 86 (1959).
33, 265 F. 2d 606 (4th Cir. 1959).
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the lobby immediately adjoining the entrance and exit doors
of the building was so narrow that she had only about 24
inches between the arc of the door through which one enter-
ed the building and a couch which was against the wall on
the opposite side of the passageway. The boy dashed into
the store unexpectedly and collided with the plaintiff just
as she was passing this point. Without reviewing the phys-
ical facts in much detail, the court referred to the trial
judge's finding that the boy's act was the sole proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury and quoted him as follows: "That
is all there was to it. If that entrance had been forty feet
wide the same thing would have happened."34 The court did
not discuss the fact that it may be the duty of the defendant
to foresee the acts of another which may, in turn, result in
harm to third persons. Keeping in mind the narrowness of
the passageway and the limited space which was allowed the
plaintiff-customer to dodge the boy running through the
doorway as was done here, it is difficult to understand how
it could be held, as a matter of law, that the defendant could
not reasonably foresee that someone might be injured as a
result. It is not necessary that the exact manner of injury
be foreseen. It should also be noted that the risk of harm such
as occurred here could have been avoided with relatively little
expense.
The case of Gilliland v. Pierce Motor Co.35 involved an in-
jury to the plaintiff caused by his slipping on a grease spot
in the defendant's garage when he was on the way out of
the garage after having collected soiled coveralls for the
laundry for which he worked. The plaintiff, assisted by his
young nephew, had only a few minutes before walked through
the garage to the locker room to collect the laundry and was
returning by the same route when he slipped on the grease
spot. The verdict for the plaintiff was set aside by a judg-
ment n.o.v. by the trial judge on the grounds that there was
no evidence to show that the defendant had either actual or
constructive knowledge of the presence of the grease spot.
There was evidence that the floor had been thoroughly clean-
ed during the holiday which immediately preceded the morn-
ing of the accident. There was also evidence that other per-
sons in the garage had passed over this same spot several
34. Id. at 606.
35. 235 S. C. 268, 111 S. E. 2d 521 (1959).
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times earlier that morning without having seen any evidenrce
of oil on the floor. As a result, the court concluded that the
oil must have been put there within such a short time prior
to the plaintiff's injury that the defendant could not be
charged with negligence in not having removed it.
(c) Miscellaneous
The South Carolina Supreme Court had little difficulty in
agreeing with the trial judge in Cooper v. Mayes36 who found
that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence when
he was injured by an electrical shock caused by his under-
taking to cut some live power lines with his pliers while
standing on an aluminum ladder, leaning against a wet pole.
Plaintiff was an experienced electrician of twenty-five years
and had ample safety equipment in his truck a few feet
away and easy access to the master switch about 200 feet
away by which he could have cut off all current in the whole
area before ascending the ladder, had he bothered to do so.
The plaintiff contended that the defendant was negligent in
that the defendant had told him about a week before that
there was no current in the line that he had attempted to
cut. The court pointed to the experience of the plaintiff as
an electrician and his own testimony that, "It is dangerous
to work on electric wires at any time." 37 Furthermore, the
plaintiff had worked on these particular wires at various
other times for the defendant and was familiar with their
dilapidated state. Plaintiff's non-suit was affirmed on appeal.
The Court of Appeals, in Berry v. Atlantic Coast Line Rail-
road,38 affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for both
defendants when the plaintiff sued the power company and
railroad for the death of her son caused by electrocution.
The deceased was assisting his brother, a crane operator for
a contractor, while they were unloading steel from a railroad
car, when he was killed. The car had been spotted on a siding
near the high power lines of the defendant electric company.
Arriving at the scene of the unloading, the crane operator had
surveyed the situation and decided that the boom on the
crane was so long that it must be shortened to avoid coming
into contact with the high power lines overhead. After short-
ening the boom, two of the four outriggers used to steady
36. 234 S. C. 491, 109 S. E. 2d 12 (1959).
37. Id. at 497, 109 S. E. 2d at 15 (1959).
38. 273 F. 2d 572 (4th Cir. 1960).
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the crane were put out at the back but none at the front.
When the first load of steel was hoisted and was being swung
around to the truck on which it was to be loaded, the decedent
was steadying it with his hand to stop its swaying, when
the crane tilted over on one side causing the boom to come
in contact with the 22,000 volt electric wire overhead and
electrocuting the plaintiff. After a thorough analysis of the
facts, the court concluded that there was no evidence suf-
ficient to justify the issue of negligence going to the jury
because the plaintiff had failed to prove that the defendant
railroad's location of the siding was unreasonable because of
the presence of the power line some 28 feet away and more
than 28 feet above ground; likewise, there was no negligence
by the power company. The court acknowledged that the
defendant power company has a very high duty of care when
dealing with anything so dangerous as high voltage electric
lines. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the fact that
the lines were placed in accordance with the regulations of
the South Carolina Public Service Commsision was at least
some evidence of due care, even though under the South Caro-
lina cases it has been held not to be conclusive evidence oG
due care. The operator of the crane was thoroughly aware
of the danger from the overhead power lines as was evidenced
by his having taken precautionary steps to avoid having the
boom strike the wires. The duty owed by the defendants
was to protect persons against the risks created or to warn
them of the risks. Since the operator knew of the risks the
defendant's duty to warn was satisfied. It was the court's
conviction that the failure on the part of the crane operator
to utilize the remaining outriggers was responsible for the
death of the decedent.39
The plaintiff's verdict for $40,000 actual damages in a
novel action arising out of the aggravation of a stomach ulcer
was reversed by the Supreme Court and judgment entered
for the defendant in Williams v. E. L DuPont DeNemour &
39. In a sequel to the principal case, the deceased's employer's work-
men's compensation insurance carrier -was taxed the costs of both defend-
ants because it did not waive its right to reimbursement for the $8,000
it had paid for compensation. The District Court pointed to the carrier's
right to control the litigation, although it did permit the litigation to be
handled by counsel for the estate of the deceased. The carrier had obtained
an order from the District Court allowing it to file a pleading setting up
a lien for the amount which it had paid. Berry v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry.
Co., 185 F. Supp. 699 (E. D. S. C. 1960).
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Co.40 It was conceded by the plaintiff that his work with the
defendant company did not cause his ulcer. Plaintiff alleged
negligence on several grounds including one that the doctor
in the defendant's medical department had given him assur-
ance that his return to work would not interfere with the
healing of his ulcer, even though his own personal physician
had advised him that it would not be in his best interest to
do so. Another allegation of negligence was the fact that
the defendant had failed to provide him with ample oppor-
tunities to get adequate rest and have frequent access to
food which his diet required. The court found that it was
unnecessary to decide whether the defendant's actions war-
ranted submission of the question of negligence to the jury
because its review of the evidence, and particularly the testi-
mony of the plaintiff himself, thoroughly convinced the court
that the plaintiff's contributory negligence was, as a matter
of law, sufficient to bar his recovery. The court properly
distinguished this case from one in which the plaintiff is
alleging that he has been required by the employer to per-
form a particular task against the employee's protest that
it would injure his health. This case was simply a question
of the plaintiff returning to his regular work duties after
having been absent for some time for the treatment of his
ulcer. He was at liberty to refuse to return to work or to
quit his job at any time.
VII. DEFAMATION
The case of Reinhardt v. State-Record Company4l involved
an alleged libel by a story in the daily newspaper relating
to the setting of preliminary hearings on the plaintiff's in-
dictment on a charge of conspiracy to file false returns for
an insurance company. The plaintiff was an insurance exam-
iner for the State Insurance Commissioner's office. He ac-
knowledged that the reference in the newspaper was accurate-
ly reported insofar as it referred to his indictment but the
alleged libel was in the fact that the story described his in-
dictment as being connected with the "Capital Life Insurance
Company conspiracy case." In the latter case a number of
parties, including the then State Insurance Commissioner,
had been charged with various fraudulent practices having
40. 235 S. C. 497, 112 S. E. 2d 485 (1960).
41. 235 S. C. 480, 112 S. E. 2d 500 (1960).
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resulted in the forced sale of the Capital Life Insurance, Com-.
pany by its owners to another company for a price of ap-
proximately one million dollars less than its true value. The
gist of the plaintiff's complaint was that he had no direct
connection with the Capital Life case and that the news
article linking his name with that case gave the impression
that he was one of the ones charged with attempting to
defraud others. He contended he was charged with a much
less serious offense and that, furthermore, on subsequent
trial he was acquitted.
The court reversed the verdict for the plaintiff and entered
judgment for the defendant on the ground that it was unable
to find anything in the record upon which to support the
contention of the plaintiff that the statements were false
and libelous, holding in effect that the plaintiff's indictment
was one facet of a case with many facets.
VIII. INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT
The case of Hopkins v. Shuman4W 2 deserves passing notice
for the recognition which it afforded to the fact that our,
Supreme Court reiterated the existence of a cause of action
in South Carolina for interference with plaintiff's employ-
ment contract.
42. 235 S. C. 191, 110 S. E. 2d 713 (1959).
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